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The Reach of Radio: Ending Civil Conflict  
through Rebel Demobilization†
By Alex Armand, Paul Atwell, and Joseph F. Gomes*
We examine the role of FM radio in mitigating violent conflict. We 
collect original data on radio broadcasts encouraging defections 
during the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency. This con-
stitutes the first quantitative evaluation of an active counterinsur-
gency policy that encourages defections through radio messages. 
Exploiting random  topography-driven variation in radio coverage 
along with panel variation at the  grid-cell level, we identify the causal 
effect of messaging on violence. Broadcasting defection messages 
increases defections and reduces fatalities, violence against civil-
ians, and clashes with security forces. Income shocks have oppos-
ing effects on both the conflict and the effectiveness of messaging.  
(JEL D74, L82, O17)
Ending entrenched insurgencies remains a fundamental challenge for policy 
actors. We provide evidence that rebels can be effectively encouraged to defect by 
sending messages over radio. Following a number of ineffectual peace agreements 
in the early 1990s, key policy actors began to go beyond  macro-level solutions and 
address individual incentives to participate in violence. Significant resources and 
attention have been focused on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration 
(DDR) programs as a means to draw combatants out of militarized structures and 
put them on a path to civilian life. Yet, few formal activities within such programs 
work to address the issues that might prevent combatants from leaving conflict and 
entering DDR programs, particularly in the absence of a stable ceasefire. Defection 
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messaging is one such initiative that has gained support and prominence in recent 
years ( UN-DDR 2014).
Defection messaging aims to mitigate and end conflict by providing active com-
batants with information on the logistics of surrender, immunity offers and judi-
cial processes, and the willingness of their families and communities to reintegrate 
them. Since print and digital media have limited reach in remote areas where armed 
groups often operate, several policy actors have opted to use FM radios to broadcast 
defection messages. This strategy has played a notable role in multiple conflicts 
around the globe.1 While the previous literature has highlighted cases of radio being 
used as a propaganda tool for inciting violence ( Yanagizawa-Drott 2014), politi-
cal mobilization (Adena et al. 2015), and ethnic hatred (DellaVigna et al. 2014), 
we examine its effectiveness as an instrument for peace. Focusing on the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency in central Africa, we provide the first quanti-
tative evaluation of a defection messaging program aimed at ending an active civil 
conflict. In addition to examining the effectiveness of defection messaging in reduc-
ing violence, we provide novel insights into armed group behavior and how eco-
nomic incentives to fight interact with counterinsurgency policies.
The LRA conflict started in northern Uganda in 1988 and has since devastated 
local populations across the region, expanding into the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), South Sudan, and Central African Republic (CAR) as it evolved. The 
insurgency was made infamous by the LRA’s brutal tactics and a notable reliance 
on abducted child soldiers. Over the course of the conflict the group has caused an 
estimated 100,000 deaths and displaced 2.5 million civilians (UN Security Council 
2013a). While its forces have now been reduced to 200 fighters or fewer, in its prime 
the group had a stable membership of as many as 3,000. Beyond its direct effect 
on violence, the conflict has inflicted a massive blow to the economy, society, and 
politics of the region, the consequences of which will be felt for a long time to come 
(Blattman 2009; Blattman and Annan 2010; Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti 2013).
FM defection messaging has been employed in the LRA conflict since the early 
2000s and has expanded dramatically since 2008. The programs have been largely 
modeled on the “Come Home” broadcasts pioneered by two stations in northern 
Uganda in the early 2000s. Programs include interviews with combatants who have 
surrendered, personal messages from family or community members, and logistical 
information on how to surrender safely. While we cannot directly observe combat-
ants receiving FM radio broadcasts, a qualitative survey of  ex-combatants that we 
undertook in northern DRC shows that more than 95 percent of the respondents 
were exposed to these messages either directly or through other LRA members.2
1 For instance, during the Vietnam War (Daddis 2017); the Colombian conflict against the FARC (John Otis, 
“Why Colombia’s Leftist Guerrillas Are Defecting,” Time, October 30, 2009, http://content.time.com/time/
world/article/0,8599,1931814,00.html); and the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria (Mary Kay Magistad, “How 
a Shortwave Radio Network Is Helping to Counter Boko Haram,” Public Radio International, May 19, 2017, 
https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-05-19/how-shortwave-radio-network-helping-counter-boko-haram). See online 
Appendix Section G for further examples.
2 Combatants could return following a wide range of pathways. Both formal and informal institutions facili-
tated forgiveness from local communities and reintegration into civilian life. Online Appendix Section F provides 
a detailed description of the institutions involved, the services offered, and the features that make forgiveness and 
reintegration possible.
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To study the effectiveness of the programs, we construct a novel dataset combining 
primary and secondary sources of data. We design and conduct a survey of radio station 
operators to collate data on the annual expansion of defection messaging in the four 
countries affected by the conflict. Through the survey, we also collect data on radio 
station characteristics, allowing us to generate  time-varying  topography-corrected 
coverage estimates, which we leverage for identification. We combine this information 
with the previously  underexploited LRA Crisis Tracker (LRACT) database. LRACT 
is a  geo-coded database providing detailed information on events related to the LRA 
from 2008 to the present. We merge these with geographically disaggregated data on 
a range of variables pertinent to conflict, resulting in a  grid-cell-level panel dataset.3
We focus on the 2008–2015 period, which is when the use of FM radios became 
a central counterinsurgency strategy. After a sustained military offensive in 2008 
drove LRA forces into remote regions of DRC, South Sudan, and CAR, they started 
operating in small groups spread across vast expanses (Lancaster, Lacaille, and 
Cakaj 2011). Under these conditions, radio represented by far the most effective 
means to communicate with potential defectors, given the LRA was known to 
acquire radio receivers. The United Nations (UN) and other international NGOs 
began expanding capacity at small community radio stations, as well as working 
with communities to establish new stations (UN Security Council 2013b). The main 
expansion of defection messaging began around 2010, hence the relevant variation 
in the data is restricted to this period. Furthermore, the LRACT began a detailed 
cataloging of LRA activities in 2008. Focusing on the  post-2008 period allows us 
to undertake an uncommonly rich analysis of the effects of radio messaging on 
conflict. We are able to go beyond just looking at the number of events or fatalities 
available from other conflict datasets. In addition to looking at actual returnees who 
willingly escape from armed group enrollment or captivity, we explore the behavior 
of the LRA when confronted by dwindling membership.
In total, 19 radio stations with 21 antennas were actively broadcasting defection 
messages during the study period, spanning an area of almost 300,000 square kilo-
meters. The phased expansion of the messaging campaign and of radio coverage over 
time allows us to estimate the causal impact of messaging by exploiting three sources 
of plausibly exogenous variation. Firstly, we measure radio coverage corrected by 
the topography of the affected area (see, for instance, Olken 2009,  Yanagizawa-Drott 
2014). Secondly, we enhance the current literature by exploiting the panel dimen-
sion of the dataset and controlling for  time-invariant unobservable characteristics at a 
highly disaggregated level. Finally, we exploit the random overlapping of radio cover-
age from different radios to build a measure of message intensity at the  grid-cell level. 
Instead of using administrative units, which might be endogenous to conflict, we use 
14 km  × 14 km grid cells for the analysis, chosen based on the geography of point 
patterns (Boots and Getis 1988, see online Appendix Section B.3).
Defection messaging has a substantial impact on  LRA-related conflict outcomes. 
A 1 standard deviation increase in the intensity of defection messaging (approxi-
mately 20 minutes of daily messaging at full cell coverage) leads to a 2.7 percent 
decrease in fatalities, a 1 percent increase in the number of returnees, and a 1 percent 
3 These data include information on natural resources such as cash crops and minerals, weather variables such as 
temperature and precipitation, and alternative media such as mobile phone coverage and general FM radio coverage.
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decrease in the number of attacks against civilians and clashes with security forces, 
but has no statistically significant effect on abduction rates. A higher intensity of 
defection messaging also leads to an increase in looting by the LRA. The increase 
in looting is primarily survival oriented. Allowing for  nonlinear effects, we find 
that the effect of defection messaging increases significantly with its intensity for 
all outcome variables. While low levels of intensity have a negligible effect, more 
than an hour of messaging per day at full cell coverage leads to an almost 15 percent 
reduction in fatalities and a 6 percent increase in returnees. These effects correspond 
to a large aggregate impact. Counterfactual estimates based on LRACT data suggest 
that defection messaging led to 1,151 (27 percent) fewer deaths, and accounted for 
297 (14 percent) of the 2,073 returnees observed in the data (Section IVB).
We interpret these findings by considering defection messaging as an instrument of 
persuasive communication affecting combatants’ behavior through one or both of two 
models (see DellaVigna and Gentzkow 2010 for a review of the literature). The first, 
a  belief-based model, considers combatants as rational agents relying on Bayesian 
updating based on new information received from the messages. The second is a 
 preference-based model, in which even if agents are not fully rational and messages 
are  noninformative, communication affects fighters’ behaviors under two conditions. 
First, if they either implicitly value the act of going back to civilian life or being part 
of the LRA, and second, if defection messaging can influence these values.4
We also exploit detailed  satellite-based data on the presence of commodities and 
natural resources to uncover evidence of heterogeneous effects of defection mes-
saging by income shocks. A burgeoning literature highlights how positive shocks to 
 labor-intensive sectors reduce conflict by increasing wages and reducing the supply 
of labor for conflict activities, i.e., the opportunity cost channel, while positive shocks 
to  capital-intensive sectors increase the returns from predation, i.e., the rapacity chan-
nel (Dal Bó and Dal Bó 2011, Dube and Vargas 2013). In the same vein, we provide 
novel evidence that both violence and the effectiveness of counterinsurgency policies 
respond to economic incentives. As is standard in the literature, we measure income 
shocks by combining the presence of commodities and natural resources with exog-
enous changes in international prices (Dube and Vargas 2013, Bazzi and Blattman 
2014, Berman et al. 2017). Using Lasso (least absolute shrinkage and selection opera-
tor) regressions for covariate selection we identify cotton and groundnut price shocks 
as the two relevant shocks in the context of the LRA from a long list of commodities. 
These shocks have opposing effects on the conflict. Exogenous positive shocks to the 
price of cotton reduce the conflict and increase the effectiveness of defection mes-
saging. A 1 standard deviation increase in the  conflict-reducing cotton price shock 
enhances the effect of defection messaging on fatalities by 1 pp. Positive price shocks 
to the  labor-intensive cotton sector arguably increase labor market opportunities and 
returns from working in the cotton sector, thereby reducing labor supply for the con-
flict sector. Positive shocks to the price of groundnut have the opposite effect. A 1 
standard deviation increase in the  conflict-inducing groundnut price shock reduces 
4 Since defection messages targeted both beliefs and preferences of fighters, both models could be relevant. This 
is a feature of all defection messaging programs ( UN-DDR 2014). In the LRA setting, this is confirmed by both 
survey data about content and by text analysis of messages. See Section IVC and online Appendix Section B.19 for 
further discussion.
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the effect of defection messaging on fatalities by 1 pp. Due to its easy appropriability, 
groundnut was being looted by the LRA (Section IVC). Hence, positive shocks to the 
groundnut sector correspond to higher incentives to fight.
This is not to say that ideology is not important in motivating combatants, espe-
cially because indoctrination played a key role during the early stage of the conflict 
(Beber and Blattman 2013). However, if fighters are also driven by economic incen-
tives, the relative  trade-off between fighting or leaving the group influences the effec-
tiveness of messaging. This is related to the broader literature on the participation 
problem which investigates how armed group leaders motivate individuals to soldier 
for their side (Blattman and Miguel 2010, Weinstein 2006, Wood 2003). Weinstein 
(2006) makes a distinction between opportunistic rebels attracted to groups with 
material resources and  ideologically motivated rebels attracted by  long-run rewards 
based on a particular set of ideals and the “pleasures of agency” (Wood 2003).5
We contribute to three distinct strands of literature. First, we contribute to the 
literature studying the effects of media on social and political outcomes.6 The recent 
literature highlights the role of radio in inciting violence and hateful attitudes. 
 Yanagizawa-Drott (2014) shows how propaganda broadcast over the radio incited 
violence during the Rwandan Genocide. Adena et al. (2015) shows how radio was 
instrumental in building public support for the Nazi party and its policies. DellaVigna 
et al. (2014) demonstrates how radio was effective in shaping hateful sentiments 
between ethnic groups in Croatia. While this literature convincingly establishes 
radio’s success in encouraging violence, it does not necessarily imply that radio will 
also be successful in the opposite direction. This is particularly relevant because 
recruitment for and defection from armed groups are separate processes (Gates 
and Nordås 2015, Gates 2017, Bénabou and Tirole 2011). Recruitment relates to 
a participation problem, in which individuals from outside the rebel group must be 
encouraged to join. Defection, on the other hand, relates to a retention problem, in 
which group leaders devise incentive schemes to ensure continued allegiance from 
members. Similarly, the path to peace is very different from the simple reversal of the 
path to conflict (Wolfsfeld 2004). Peace involves confronting the legal, social, and 
psychological penalties of having participated in the conflict. In contrast, convincing 
an individual to join a conflict is often ideologically motivated, with nebulous returns 
coming in a later period, or through the use of force.7 We provide novel evidence on 
the effectiveness of radio in mitigating pernicious outcomes and reducing violent 
conflict.
Second, we contribute to the nascent quantitative literature examining counter-
insurgency policies. While much of this literature concentrates on the causes and 
consequences of conflicts (Blattman and Miguel 2010), the restoration of peace 
5 While moral outrage over government abuses led to conflict in El Salvador (Wood 2003), material incentives 
directly affected conflicts in Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Peru (Weinstein 2006).
6 Previous contributions focus on its effects on political accountability (Besley and Burgess 2002, Strömberg 
2004), voting (DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007), crime (Dahl and DellaVigna 2009), social capital (Olken 2009), 
women’s agency (Jensen and Oster 2009; La Ferrara, Chong, and Duryea 2012),  interethnic relations (Blouin and 
Mukand 2019), and social attitudes (Paluck and Green 2009).
7 See online Appendix H for further discussion on the asymmetric effects of media on violence and peace. 
Furthermore, broadcasting defection messages could have possibly deterred defection if the LRA became more 
vigilant against potential defectors as the result of it.
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once conflicts become entrenched remains  underinvestigated.8 An emerging litera-
ture highlights the importance of civilian cooperation for the success of counterin-
surgency (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011; Berman, Felter, and Shapiro 2018).9 
Berman, Shapiro, and Felter (2011) provides evidence about the effectiveness of 
mixing service provision with coercion to curry civilian support and gather informa-
tion on insurgents during the Iraq War. For the same conflict, Shapiro and Weidmann 
(2015) highlights how mobile communications reduce insurgent violence through 
improved information sharing by civilians. While these studies focus on the role of 
civilians, the literature lacks evidence on policies directly targeting combatants. We 
fill this gap by providing the first evaluation of a counterinsurgency policy that tar-
gets rebels through messages encouraging defections. Attempts at evaluating such 
 media-based peace building policies are conspicuously absent from the literature 
despite their widespread use.10
Finally, we view this paper as a starting point for a new literature studying how 
DDR programs, peace agreements, and amnesties can be made to work. Despite 
the importance of these policies in recent history, rigorous quantitative evaluations 
are scarce. A total of 297 conflict amnesties were granted between 1946 and 2010 
(Dancy 2018). From 1989 to 2010, 40 DDR programs were implemented, of which 
14 were instituted during ongoing conflicts (Banholzer 2014). Furthermore, 80 out 
of the 216 peace agreements signed between 1975 and 2011 had provisions for 
DDR (Högbladh 2011). Defection messaging could potentially be effective in all 
these contexts as a means to get information across to rebels about possibilities of 
return. We provide evidence on the working of an existing amnesty/DDR policy in 
bringing rebels off the battlefield.
I. Background
The Lord’s Resistance Army was formed in 1988, when its leader Joseph Kony 
united remnants of several failed insurgent groups in northern Uganda. Those groups, 
and, by extension, the LRA, are rooted in  long-standing ethnoregional divisions in 
Uganda. In 1986, President Yoweri Museveni successfully led a largely southern rebel 
force to power. While many northern elements supported change in Kampala, they 
violently rejected his southern rule. Despite their resolve, by 1988, most organized 
resistance to Museveni’s presidency had either surrendered or disbanded under heavy 
pressure from the Ugandan Army (UPDF). The few elements that remained joined the 
small, but growing, LRA, which held the ostensible goal of a democratic and spiritual 
restoration of the nation.11 Since then, the conflict has ravaged local communities. 
This was due to episodes of open conflict between Ugandan government forces and the 
LRA, but even more common and costly was the targeting of  noncombatants by both 
sides, including the torturing, maiming, and killing of individuals for  noncooperation 
8 One notable exception is Humphreys and Weinstein (2007), which investigates the determinants of successful 
reintegration in the  post-conflict phase.
9 This factor is important in  information-scarce asymmetric conflicts, in which one of the two sides enjoys a 
capability advantage and victory is determined by the accurate flow of information from civilians.
10 Online Appendix Section G discusses the generalizability of this paper’s findings with respect to this liter-
ature. There is a related separate strand of the literature on reducing crime and youth violence. See, for instance, 
Blattman, Jamison, and Sheridan (2017); Heller (2014); and Heller et al. (2017).
11 For a more  in-depth account of the historical origins of the LRA, see Allen and Vlassenroot (2010).
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or suspected collaboration with enemy forces. Beyond these tactics, the LRA stood 
out for their reliance on the abduction and indoctrination of children as soldiers, which 
ultimately brought them international notoriety.
With the hope of ending years of relentless violent conflict, the Ugandan 
Amnesty Act of 2000 offered a blanket amnesty to LRA combatants who were 
willing to abandon violence. It is in this context that defection messaging has 
evolved from a modest innovation at two radio stations to become a central tool 
in reducing LRA numbers. Aware of the fear that LRA combatants and abducted 
individuals had of returning home despite the passing of the 2000 Amnesty Act, 
radio stations in Lira and Gulu (northern Uganda) began broadcasting programs 
encouraging LRA members to defect. Broadcasts featured family members, often 
parents, speaking to LRA combatants by name (many of whom were abductees 
coerced into violence) assuring them they would be welcome and forgiven should 
they return. In other instances, they featured former LRA members speaking out 
to assure active fighters of their good health and freedom, while also emphasizing 
the need to return. The following is an example transcript from a program featur-
ing a former LRA member: “I ask you [name of LRA soldier] to take very good 
care of your soldiers so that they don’t commit any crimes, and lead them to the 
[Ugandan Army], or the UN or MONUC in Duru or Gilima. Just bring all your sol-
diers there. There is nothing bad they do to people here. Just take your time with 
all your people and come out of the bush.” Online Appendix Section E provides 
additional examples.
Following years of harsh conflict, the Ugandan government and the LRA signed 
a fragile ceasefire through the 2006 Juba peace talks. These talks permanently broke 
down in 2008 when, as part of the  US-supported Operation Lightning Thunder, the 
armed forces of Uganda, DRC, and South Sudan launched aerial attacks and raids 
on the LRA camps in northern DRC. This was soon met with brutal revenge by the 
LRA on local communities as it began its dispersion in northeastern DRC, eastern 
CAR, and western South Sudan. Following this de facto expulsion from Uganda in 
2008, the FM radio messaging model was soon elevated as a policy tool to dimin-
ish LRA forces in the isolated border regions. With the assistance of the American 
NGO Invisible Children and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission 
in Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), new radio stations were built and 
other community stations were expanded. One community station in the Central 
African Republic, Radio Zereda, went from operating with a car battery and an 
umbrella skeleton to an estimated broadcast radius of almost 200 km in 2011. Today, 
in affected areas, FM stations cover about 300,000 square km.
While we cannot directly observe combatants receiving defection messages 
through the FM radio broadcasts, qualitative evidence suggests high exposure to 
the messages. Results from our own independent survey of  ex-combatants in north-
ern DRC (see online Appendix Section D for details) show that 73 percent of the 
respondents were listening to the radio while with the LRA. Of this 73 percent, 
89 percent had heard defection messages over the radio during their stint with the 
LRA (66 percent of the full sample). Furthermore, 94 percent of respondents had 
heard other members discussing these broadcasts. Combining direct and indirect 
exposure, 96 percent of the respondents were exposed to radio messages. Finally, 
67 percent of respondents say that defection broadcasts influenced their decision to 
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return.12 In addition, Rigterink, Kenyi, and Schomerus (2016) finds that 65 percent 
of households in the  LRA-affected counties of Ezo and Tambura in South Sudan 
heard messages targeting the LRA in 2013, despite only 33 percent of interviewed 
households owning a radio, and only 27 percent being able to receive the radio 
signal. Another study finds 89 percent of returnees citing defection messaging as 
“influential in their decision to escape” (Invisible Children 2013).
Figure 1 plots the geographic distribution of  LRA-related events for the period 
1989–2015, divided into  pre-2008 and  post-2008 periods. The geographic areas 
affected by the conflict differ markedly across the two periods. We focus on the 
expansion of the defection program in the border regions of Uganda, DRC, South 
Sudan, and CAR in the  post-2008 period.
II. Data
The  time-varying  cell-level dataset collates data from a myriad of sources. In this 
section, we provide a detailed description of the main variables used in the paper.
A. FM Radio Stations and Coverage
The defection messaging data are based on an original survey of an exhaustive set 
of radio stations that have broadcast defection messaging content aimed at the LRA. 
We generated the universe of participating radio stations by  cross-referencing policy 
reports and through direct exchanges with international actors and radio operators. 
We then designed and administered a questionnaire aimed at the radio station man-
agers of the participating radio stations. Collating the data from the survey, we con-
struct a panel dataset with information about each station’s  LRA-related messaging, 
including content and frequency, as well as other station characteristics, such as 
12 Since combatants who do not return are not observed, these numbers should be read as being conditional on 
being a returnee.
Figure 1. Extent of  LRA-Related Violent Events, 1989–2015
Notes: The geographical distribution of  LRA-related violent events in the two periods: 1989–2007 (panel A) and 
2008–2015 (panel B). The geographic extent of the figure is restricted to the study area. 
Sources: UCDP dataset (which provides data for the whole period of 1989–2015). Basemap source: Esri (see online 
Appendix A for details and attributions).
Panel A. 1989–2007 Panel B. 2008–2015
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normal ( nondefection) programming. We also collect  time-varying information on 
the technical characteristics of each radio station, including their exact geographic 
location, antenna height, and transmitter power, from which we calculate the geo-
graphical reach of each radio station.
We gather information on all radio stations that broadcast defection messaging 
during the 2008–2015 period (21 antennas belonging to 19 radio stations).13 During 
this period the broadcasting of defection messaging expanded over time in multiple 
dimensions. While some existing radio stations increased their coverage by upgrad-
ing equipment, in other cases altogether new radio stations opened in other areas. 
Figure 2 shows the coverage of radio stations undertaking defection messaging in 
the  LRA-affected area across four distinct years during the study period. During this 
period, while most radio stations broadcast defection messaging continuously once 
they started, two stations ceased broadcasting by the end of 2015 due to technical 
failures (one of which was due to a lightning strike).
13 Online Appendix Section C provides further details about the survey. We collected data on all 26 radio sta-
tions with 30 antennas that have broadcast defection messaging targeted at the LRA at any time. While we gathered 
information about the radio stations broadcasting defection messages during the  pre-2008 period (including stations 
in Uganda), the data are unreliable (see discussion in online Appendix Section C).
Figure 2. The Expansion of Radio Stations Broadcasting Defection Messaging in  LRA-Affected Areas
Notes: The figure plots the coverage of active radio stations in different years. We select all radio stations that broad-
cast defection messages for at least one year during the 2008–2015 period. Coverage is corrected for topography 
using the technical specifications of the radio stations and applying the Longley-Rice/Irregular Terrain Model. See 
Figure 5 for a comparison with defection messaging intensity. The geographic extent of the figures is restricted to 
the study area. 
Sources: Basemap: Esri (see online Appendix A for details and attributions); graph content produced by the authors.
Panel A. 2008 Panel B. 2010
Panel C. 2012 Panel D. 2015
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While the expansion of radio messaging is possibly endogenous to conflict 
outcomes, as part of the identification strategy, we exploit the exogenous varia-
tion in the exposure to radio signals arising from the randomness of topography 
(explained in detail in Section III). Following the previous literature, we construct 
 topography-corrected radio coverage using the Longley-Rice/Irregular Terrain 
Model (Enikolopov, Petrova, and Zhuravskaya 2011;  Yanagizawa-Drott 2014; 
Olken 2009; Adena et al. 2015; DellaVigna et al. 2014). The model takes in station 
parameters and topographic characteristics to determine which areas receive a sig-
nal from the station and at what strength at a maximum of  90-meter resolution and 
a minimum of 30 meters.14 Online Appendix Section B.1 provides further details on 
this procedure, including an example. Figure 2 shows the coverage of radio stations 
broadcasting defection messages incorporating this correction.
Table 1 presents the descriptive characteristics of the radio stations by using anten-
nas as a unit of observation. Among the 21 radio antennas, 19 percent were based in 
CAR, 62 percent in DRC, 19 percent in South Sudan, and 81 percent were broadcast-
ing defection messages in 2015. During the period of 2008–2015, on average, radios 
were broadcasting approximately 76 minutes of defection content daily. Audible 
radio signals reached approximately 91 km, on average, from the radio towers.
B. Conflict Intensity
 LRA-related conflict data are based on the LRA Crisis Tracker (LRACT) data-
base (Resolve 2015). LRACT is an  event-based data collection project that began 
in 2008 through the efforts of two policy NGOs: the Resolve LRA Crisis Initiative 
and Invisible Children. The goal of LRACT is to provide detailed and disaggregated 
data on LRA activities to better inform policy actors’ strategies and activities. It pro-
vides  geo-coded information about  LRA-related events, including fatalities, defec-
tions, abductions, violence against civilians, clashes with security forces, and looting 
across space and time. Nearly all the events are located in the CAR, DRC, South 
Sudan, and Uganda. LRACT reports events at the maximum spatial resolution of the 
population center where the event occurred and at maximum temporal resolution of 
the day of the event. Online Appendix A provides additional information on the com-
position, definition, and evolution of the conflict events over time.
We supplement the LRACT data with conflict data from the Uppsala Conflict 
Data Program (UCDP) database (Sundberg and Melander 2013) and the Armed 
Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) database (Raleigh et al. 2010). 
Each of these datasets provides  event-based information, supplying precise dates 
and  geo-coded locations of events across the study area. Each of the three datasets 
draw on reports from news agencies, NGOs, and governments. However, beyond 
this, LRACT draws on a widespread network of field sources, some linked by high 
frequency (HF) radio. This allows LRACT verifiers to find corroborating accounts 
of events sourced from other channels, as well as to report events that alternative 
 event-based datasets fail to capture. While all three of the datasets aim to measure 
14 Kasampalis et al. (2013) shows that measurement error in the model is small, with raw correlation between 
actual and predicted coverage in a specific geographic point being equal to 0.8. We expect measurement error to be 
even smaller here owing to  cell-level averaging of coverage.
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Table 1—Descriptive Statistics
Mean SD Min. Max. Observations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A.  Antenna-level characteristics
Situation in 2015
Share of active antennas 0.90 0.30 0 1 21
Share broadcasting defection content 0.81 0.40 0 1 21
Location: Central African Republic 0.19 0.40 0 1 21
Location: DR Congo 0.62 0.50 0 1 21
Location: South Sudan 0.19 0.40 0 1 21
Average,  2008–2015
Hours  on-air (when active) 11.82 4.10 6 24 21
Daily minutes of defection messaging 75.58 54.37 9 220 21
Daily minutes of sensitization content 59.29 44.33 6 173 21
Daily minutes of logistical content 16.29 12.27 0 47 21
Distance reached by signal (km) 91.41 22.11 48 123 21
Panel B.  Cell-level characteristics, 2008–2015
Radio coverage
Cell covered by defection messaging 0.09 0.29 0 1 60,600
Intensity of messaging 3.46 18.91 0 371 60,600
Distance to closest antenna (km) 325.23 169.40 2 848 60,600
Median distance from active antennas (km) 489.14 184.38 6 1,012 60,600
Cell covered (circular coverage) 0.19 0.39 0 1 60,600
Conflict (LRACT database)
Total fatalities 0.05 1.74 0 184 60,600
Number of returnees 0.03 0.62 0 39 60,600
Number of abductees 0.11 2.16 0 207 60,600
Events: violence against civilians 0.01 0.10 0 3 60,600
Events: clashes 0.00 0.07 0 2 60,600
Events: looting 0.02 0.27 0 23 60,600
Conflict (ACLED database)
Number of events (LRA) 0.02 0.39 0 30 60,600
Number of events (LRA attacking) 0.01 0.35 0 29 60,600
Number of events (LRA attacked) 0.00 0.08 0 10 60,600
Total fatalities (LRA) 0.09 3.88 0 515 60,600
Number of events ( non-LRA) 0.07 1.05 0 85 60,600
Total fatalities ( non-LRA) 0.37 13.14 0 1,707 60,600
Conflict (UCDP database)
Number of events (LRA) 0.01 0.17 0 16 60,600
Number of events (LRA attacking) 0.01 0.13 0 10 60,600
Number of events (LRA attacked) 0.00 0.06 0 6 60,600
Total fatalities (LRA) 0.06 1.94 0 241 60,600
Number of events ( non-LRA) 0.01 0.27 0 28 60,600
Total fatalities ( non-LRA) 0.21 8.27 0 1,012 60,600
Other indicators
FM coverage (percent cell) 0.32 0.40 0 1 60,600
GSM coverage (percent cell) 0.18 0.37 0 1 60,600
Mean precipitation (mm/day) 3.69 1.00 1 7 60,600
Average temperature (°C) 26.29 2.79 19 37 60,600
Population (log) 7.56 1.59 3 12 60,600
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for all radio stations in the sample for the final year, 2015; the aver-
age for the years 2008–2015; and  cell-level descriptive statistics for cells at the 0.125 °  × 0.125 ° resolution (approx-
imately 14 km  × 14 km at the equator). Share of active antennas indicates the share of antennas that participated 
in the defection messaging effort and are still operating in 2015, independently from the content broadcast. Share 
broadcasting defection content reports the share of radio stations that are actively broadcasting defection mes-
sages. Distance reached by signal is computed as the seventy-fifth percentile of the distance reached by an antenna. 
Distance to closest antenna is computed as minimum distance of the cell’s centroid to an active antenna. Population 
is the log of the population living within a cell. Intensity of messaging is the total number of minutes of daily defec-
tion messaging broadcast in a cell, corrected by the share of the cell covered by radio signal (equation (1)). See 
online Appendix Section A for further information on the variables.
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the same basic trends in conflict intensity, they use slightly different definitions. The 
LRACT logs any reported sighting or event plausibly involving the LRA. UCDP 
qualifies an event as an incident characterized by “armed force by an organized actor 
against another organized actor, or against civilians, resulting in at least 1 direct 
death” (Sundberg and Melander 2013, p. 524). ACLED codes all events identified 
as political violence in the developing world, focusing on civil and communal con-
flicts, violence against civilians, rioting and protesting.
Figure 3 plots the evolution of  LRA-related violence from the three different 
datasets for the years 1997 to 2015 (the LRACT database is available only from 
the year 2008). Panel A presents the number of events and panel B shows the num-
ber of  LRA-related fatalities. While the LRA Crisis Tracker’s broader definition 
of events is apparent, events from the three datasets follow similar trends. Online 
Appendix Section B.20 discusses potential issues deriving from differences across 
data sources, and the robustness of the main results with respect to these.
C.  Grid-Cell Construction
To construct the units of observation, we superimpose a grid of  equally sized cells 
over the territory affected by the LRA and hold this stable over the entire period of 
analysis. This approach avoids the potential endogeneity of political boundaries to 
violence and allows controlling for  cell-specific,  time-invariant, unobservable char-
acteristics (Harari and La Ferrara 2018). This is particularly relevant in this context, 
since many conflict events are concentrated in the bordering regions of multiple 
countries. We replicate the analysis using  district-level administrative boundaries, 
showing that conclusions are unaffected (see online Appendix Section B.13).
There are no clear precedents in the existing literature on the appropriate  grid-cell 
resolution. We draw on geography literature and choose grid cells of 0.125 °  × 0.125 ° 
resolution (approximately 14 km  × 14 km at the equator) based on the geography of 
point patterns (Boots and Getis 1988). Finally, we aggregate events at the  cell-year 
level over the 2008–2015 period to generate the final dataset. Aggregating events 
reduces the possibility of measurement errors in the exact location and timing of 
Figure 3. The Intensity of  LRA-Related Conflict, 1997–2015
Notes: The time series of conflict intensity from the ACLED, UCDP, and LRACT databases. Panel A presents the 
number of events, while panel B focuses on the number of total fatalities. Vertical dotted lines represent the year in 
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each event. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of violent events occurring in a 
given cell, as well as descriptive statistics on radio coverage and characteristics of 
defection messaging content. The sample includes all cells for the whole period of 
analysis.15
D. Additional Data
We supplement the database with additional  cell-level information on a wide 
range of variables. Firstly, we exploit  satellite-image-based information on income 
shocks. Following a wide stream of papers, we measure income shocks by com-
modity price shocks (Dube and Vargas 2013, Berman et al. 2017). We first select the 
main cash crops and extractive minerals for each of the four countries that form part 
of the study area from the CIA World Factbook (CIA 2019). See online Appendix 
Table B10 for a full list. We construct commodity price shocks by combining the 
geographical distribution of commodities with yearly  commodity-specific price 
variations in international markets. Following Bazzi and Blattman (2014), we define 
the price shock for any commodity as the difference in their (log-)prices between 
times  t and  t − 1 . Since the area under consideration is not a  world-leading producer 
in any of the considered commodities, international prices are exogenous to local 
production. To take into account the differences in the extent of crops cultivated 
within each cell, we multiply the price change with the percentage of the cell histori-
cally farmed with each crop. Online Appendix Section B.10 provides further details.
Secondly, we collect information on mobile phone coverage and general FM 
radio coverage. We build  cell-level percentage coverage of the GSM (2G) network 
by using the Collins Mobile Coverage Explorer (GSMA 2012), which provides 
 geo-located information on yearly mobile phone coverage. During the period under 
analysis, the area of interest is not covered by any of the other types of mobile phone 
network, such as 3G or 4G. We construct general FM radio coverage from FMLIST 
(UKW/ TV-Arbeitskreis 2018), an  open-source database containing technical data 
about active FM radio stations from across the world.16 We select radio stations cov-
ering the study area (corresponding to more than 500 stations) and use the Longley-
Rice/Irregular Terrain Model to compute  topography-corrected coverage at the cell 
level. Figure 4 presents GSM and general FM coverage in the study area. GSM 
network covers 18 percent of the study area, while alternative FM radios cover 32 
percent of the study area. Most of the area experiencing high levels of LRA conflict 
during the 2008–2015 period is not covered by either GSM or other FM signals. 
GSM coverage is relatively stable during the period (online Appendix Figure B2).
Finally, we merge the grid dataset with  time-varying weather data (rainfall, 
temperature, and the share of a year experiencing drought) and a number of 
socioeconomic and geographic indicators. This allows controlling for possible 
confounders of commodity price shocks and for additional factors potentially 
15 We provide a more detailed discussion about the choice of the grid extent and robustness to alternative grid 
extents in online Appendix Section B.2, and about the choice of cell resolution, including its effect on main esti-
mates, and the modifiable areal unit problem (MAUP) in online Appendix Section B.3. See online Appendix Figure 
B5 for a graphical representation of the grid resolution.
16 These data are available for only one point in time, corresponding to the moment in which the database is 
downloaded. We use data from March 2, 2018. See DellaVigna et al. (2014) for a previous use of the dataset.
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affecting violence. Online Appendix Section A provides detailed information on 
the sources and calculations of all variables.
III. Empirical Strategy
To identify the causal effects of radio defection messaging on the LRA con-
flict, we rely on three sources of plausibly exogenous variation. First, we exploit 
local topographic variation as a random determinant of signal reception (see, 
for instance, Enikolopov, Petrova, and Zhuravskaya 2011;  Yanagizawa-Drott 
2014; Olken 2009; Adena et al. 2015; DellaVigna et al. 2014). The propaga-
tion of FM radio signal depends primarily on the height of the antenna and 
the power of the transmitter. Without obstacles, the attenuation of the signal 
is proportional to the square of the distance from the antenna. In the presence 
of physical obstacles such as hills or mountains, the signal can be physically 
blocked, creating patterns in the local coverage of the radio signal which are 
exogenous to local political and  socioeconomic conditions or conflict outcomes 
(see, for instance, online Appendix Figure B1).
Second, given the  time-varying nature of the data, we are able to use  cell-level 
fixed effects. This captures all unobserved characteristics of the cell that are invari-
ant over time. Importantly, it eliminates the possibility that at any particular point in 
time certain cells experience violence either due to their topography or due to other 
characteristics that do not change over time.
Finally, we strengthen the identification strategy further by looking at the inten-
sity of exposure to the messages rather than mere exposure. While exposure refers to 
the percentage of the cell covered by a radio signal adjusted by topography, intensity 
takes into account the actual number of minutes of messaging reaching each cell. 
Exploiting the random overlap of different radio signals, we construct a measure of 
Figure 4. Mobile Phone and Alternative FM Radio Coverage
Notes: Panel A plots the coverage of the GSM mobile phone network. Panel B plots the coverage of general FM 
radio stations which broadcast general content unrelated to defection messaging. GSM network coverage is com-
puted for the year 2015 from Coverage Data Collins Bartholomew Ltd. and GSMA 2017. FM coverage is computed 
for the year 2017 from the FMLIST database (UKW/ TV-Arbeitskreis 2018). FM coverage is corrected for topog-
raphy by using the technical specifications of the radio stations and applying the Longley-Rice/Irregular Terrain 
Model. The geographic area is restricted to the study area. See online Appendix A for further information on the 
variables. 
Sources: Basemap: Esri (see online Appendix A for details and attributions); graph content produced by the authors.
Panel A. GSM coverage Panel B. General FM coverage
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messaging intensity by summing up the daily exposure from each radio within each 
cell. We define intensity of messaging by
(1)  d m it =  ∑ 
j=1
J
  c ijt  h jt ,
where  c ijt is the percentage of cell  i covered by radio  j (of a total of J possible radios) 
at time  t , and  h jt is the number of minutes of defection messaging broadcast daily by 
radio  j at time  t .17 Intensity takes the value 0 if either the cell is not covered by any 
defection messaging at a certain point in time or if it is covered by a radio station 
that is not broadcasting any defection messaging. Figure 5 illustrates how, in the 
presence of multiple radio stations, topography can generate random differences 
in the total number of minutes of messaging to which each cell is exposed. Online 
Appendix Figure B2 plots the evolution of exposure or coverage (left panel) and the 
intensity (right panel) of defection messaging content over time. Section IVA shows 
that results are robust to alternative definitions.
To measure the effect of the intensity of defection messaging ( d m it ) on  LRA-related 
conflict outcomes (denoted by  y irt , in cell  i being part of  macro-region  r at time  t ), 
we estimate the following model as the benchmark specification:
(2)  y irt =  γ i + αd m it +  𝐗 it ′ β +  δ t  M r +  u it ,
where  𝐗 it is a vector of  cell-level,  time-varying characteristics,  γ i are cell fixed 
effects, and  u it are idiosyncratic error terms. We rely on Lasso regressions to choose 
controls  𝐗 it .18 Lasso regressions select shocks to the prices of cotton and groundnut 
as the relevant commodity price shocks, as well as rainfall and temperature devia-
tions, and the fraction of a year characterized by drought as the other relevant vari-
ables. We also include  macro-region-specific time fixed effects by dividing the grid 
into eight  macro-regions and introducing interaction terms between the time fixed 
effects,  δ t , and  macro-region indicators,  M r . In all specifications, we standardize the 
main independent variable  d m it , to ease the interpretation of the coefficient.
The parameter  α captures the effect of an increase in the daily intensity of defec-
tion messaging at full cell coverage. Since we measure signal coverage corrected for 
topography, defection messaging intensity is plausibly exogenous to conflict. One 
possible threat to identification could arise if antennas have been placed endoge-
nously to the conflict. This would be the case if antennas have been placed in loca-
tions where violence increased (or decreased) and the distance from the antennas 
hides unobserved determinants of violence. Following  Yanagizawa-Drott (2014), 
we rule out the possibility of endogenous location of antennas by controlling for 
distance from active antennas and its square. In addition, since multiple antennas 
might cover a single cell, we also control for the median distance from all active 
antennas and its square. Since signal strength in a specific cell is also affected by ter-
rain ruggedness, we also interact distances with this indicator. We refer to this set of 
17 For some stations the frequency of messaging is not daily. In these cases, we computed  h jt by dividing the total 
broadcast time of defection messaging in a week by 7.
18 Lasso regressions provide objective criteria for covariate selection. Online Appendix Section B.10 provides 
details about the procedure.
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 controls as the propagation controls. Results are robust to less flexible forms, such 
as controlling only for the minimum distance from active antennas. In Section IVD, 
we also discuss the possibility that each radio responded to an expected reduc-
tion in violence with increased radio messaging. We do not find evidence of this 
possibility.19
19 We use Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) data for DRC and CAR to test whether, in the study area, 
 preexistent household characteristics correlate with the future intensity of defection messaging in a village. We do 
not observe any significant effect of future intensity of messaging on  preexistent wealth (unavailable for CAR), 
education, or fertility. This supports the exogeneity of messaging intensity. Due to the sampling strategy of the DHS 
and the remoteness of the study area, this analysis can be carried out only with a very small number of DHS clusters.
Figure 5. Geographic Distribution of Messaging Intensity
Notes: The geographic distribution of defection messaging intensity (total number of minutes of daily broadcast at 
full cell coverage) across years. Darker colors represent higher intensity, while lighter colors represent lower inten-
sity (with transparent cells showing zero coverage). The cell resolution is 0.125 °  × 0.125 ° (see online Appendix 
Figure B6 for the grid extent). 
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When estimating equation (2), we are concerned not only about serial correlation 
of violence within each cell over time, but also about spatial correlation between 
adjacent cells. We therefore estimate standard errors using the correction outlined 
by Conley (1999, 2008) and Hsiang (2010).20 We allow for temporal correlation 
over the full-time window of the dataset, and spatial correlation across cells within 
100 kilometers. Results are robust to alternative  cutoffs or assuming clustering at the 
cell or at the district level (online Appendix Section B.17).
A general drawback of conflict datasets is that events might be more likely to be 
reported in areas with high media coverage. At the same time, conflict tends to affect 
media coverage, as reporting from affected areas is more dangerous. Since we are 
directly interested in coverage, we acknowledge that estimates might contain errors, 
but we expect that these would only cause an underestimation of the importance of 
defection messaging (see online Appendix Section B.20 for a more detailed discussion 
on measurement error). Furthermore, since we cannot directly observe LRA members 
listening to radio messages, we can interpret estimates as an  intention-to-treat effect 
of defection messaging. However, available qualitative evidence suggests widespread 
exposure to defection messaging, with the proportion of returnees citing defection 
messaging as being influential in their decision to return ranging from 67 percent to 
almost 90 percent (online Appendix Section D, Invisible Children 2013).
IV. Results
A. Effectiveness of Defection Messaging
We start by examining the effects of defection messaging on violent conflict as 
measured by the number of  LRA-related fatalities from three alternative sources 
of data (Table 2). Columns 1 to 3 use data from the LRACT, ACLED, and UCDP 
databases (indicated by the column headings). Column 4 combines the three differ-
ent sources together by using the mean number of fatalities from across the three 
datasets as the dependent variable. The results are robust to alternative ways of com-
bining the three datasets (online Appendix Section B.20).
In panel A we use the  log-transformed number of total fatalities (adding 1 to 
accommodate zero values) as the dependent variable. Row 1 presents estimates 
based on the benchmark specification, i.e., equation (2). As explained in Section III, 
this specification controls for cell and year fixed effects, propagation controls, other 
 time-varying controls, and  macro-region-specific time fixed effects. The benchmark 
estimates show that defection messaging reduces  LRA-related fatalities significantly.
The estimate based on the LRACT database suggests that a 1 standard devia-
tion increase in messaging intensity reduces the number of fatalities by 2.7 percent. 
This effect corresponds to 48 minutes of daily messaging at average cell coverage 
(roughly 40 percent of the cell) or 19 minutes of daily messaging when the cell 
is fully covered by the radio signal. The result is robust to using data on fatalities 
from either the ACLED, UCDP, or a combination of the three datasets (columns 
2–4). The marginal effect is similar using the UCDP dataset, but somewhat smaller 
20 We rely on codes from Fetzer (2014) to implement the correction.
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Table 2—Effect of Defection Messaging on Fatalities
Dependent variable: Number of fatalities linked to LRA activity
Event dataset: LRACT ACLED UCDP Combined
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Dependent variable in logs—log(y + 1)
 1. Benchmark −0.027 −0.016 −0.025 −0.029
(0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
A1. Alternative set of controls
 2. Basic controls −0.029 −0.017 −0.026 −0.031
(0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
 3. Basic and additional controls −0.028 −0.017 −0.026 −0.030
(0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
 4. Benchmark +  variable-specific trends −0.027 −0.016 −0.025 −0.028
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
 5. Benchmark + control for circular coverage −0.028 −0.016 −0.025 −0.029
(0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
A2. Alternative measure for messaging
 6. Average intensity of messaging −0.012 −0.009 −0.013 −0.014
(0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
 7. Percent cell covered by defection messaging −0.102 −0.071 −0.101 −0.121
(0.020) (0.013) (0.018) (0.021)
Panel B. Alternative dependent variable
 8. log(y + 0.5) −0.034 −0.019 −0.031 −0.036
(0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007)
 9. Square root of y −0.044 −0.032 −0.041 −0.046
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
 10. Levels −0.275 −0.326 −0.273 −0.291
(0.068) (0.098) (0.058) (0.061)
 11. Extensive margin −0.011 −0.004 −0.009 −0.013
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Observations 60,600 60,600 60,600 60,600
Number of cells 7,575 7,575 7,575 7,575
Notes: The table reports marginal effects that are estimated using a fixed effects model. Standard errors in parenthe-
ses are allowed to be correlated over time and space (Conley 1999, 2008; Hsiang 2010). Unless otherwise specified, 
the independent variable is always intensity of defection messaging, defined by equation (1), and is standardized. In 
panel A the dependent variable is the log number of total fatalities (adding 1 unit before taking logarithms to accom-
modate zero values). Row 1 controls for cell and year fixed effects, propagation controls (including controls for dis-
tance from active antennas in different forms), commodity price shocks, weather shocks, and  macro-region-specific 
time fixed effects (see Section III). Row 2 controls only for cell and year fixed effects. Row 3 adds propagation 
controls to the controls from row 2. Row 4 reverts to the benchmark specification of row 1, but also includes con-
trols for  cell-level  variable-specific trends for terrain ruggedness,  ex ante income (proxied by nightlight),  ex ante 
population, urban area indicators, and country indicators. Row 5 controls for predicted  free-space circular cover-
age. Rows 6 and 7 use alternative independent variables: average intensity calculated by dividing messaging inten-
sity by the number of radio stations messaging in a particular cell (row 6); percentage of cell covered by defection 
messaging without considering frequency of messaging (row 7). Panel B replicates the benchmark specification 
from row 1 using alternative functional forms for the dependent variable, as indicated by the row names. Extensive 
margin refers to a binary  0–1 dependent variable indicating  nonzero values of the outcome variable. Columns 1 to 
3 use fatalities data from the LRACT, ACLED, and UCDP databases. Column 4 uses the mean number of fatalities 
from across the three datasets. The time period is restricted to 2008–2015. See online Appendix A for further infor-
mation on the variables.
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using the ACLED dataset. This possibly reflects the slightly different definitions of 
the conflict variable across the three datasets. While ACLED and UCDP provide 
less detailed information about LRA activity and use different definitions of violent 
events, they corroborate the main results based on the LRACT data.21
Results are robust to a wide range of robustness checks relative to the selection of 
control variables (panel A1). Row 2 in Table 2 uses a more basic set of controls that 
includes only cell and year fixed effects. Row 3 enhances this by including the prop-
agation controls. Row 4 reverts to the benchmark specification, but also includes 
controls for  variable-specific trends in addition to the controls from the benchmark 
specification. This specification allows controlling for differential trends associated 
with potential determinants of conflict, such as  cell-level terrain ruggedness,  ex ante 
income (proxied by nightlight),  ex ante population, urban area indicators, and coun-
try indicators (see online Appendix Section B.4 for more details). Row 5 adds a 
control for predicted  free-space circular coverage of the radio stations undertaking 
defection messaging. Circular coverage is computed using a  free-space propagation 
model, which captures the attenuation and maximum reach of an audible signal in 
the absence of obstacles on flat terrain. Adding it as a control allows us to isolate the 
effects solely due to idiosyncratic variation in topography (Olken 2009). The coeffi-
cient on intensity of messaging is not affected by including this control, supporting 
the hypothesis that topography generates random variation in messaging coverage.
Results are also robust to alternative measures of defection messaging as the 
independent variable (panel A2). Row 6 uses average intensity, which is calculated 
by dividing  d m it in equation (1) by the number of radio stations messaging in a par-
ticular cell. Row 7 abstracts from a measure of intensity by using the percentage of 
cell covered by defection messaging, without incorporating the frequency (minutes) 
of messaging. This is similar to the variation exploited by  Yanagizawa-Drott (2014). 
Results remain robust to these alternative definitions. Using the lagged value of 
intensity of defection messaging rather than the contemporaneous value leads to 
similar conclusions (online Appendix Section B.6).22
Panel B of Table 2 focuses on alternative functional forms of the dependent vari-
able: an alternative  log-transformation (adding 0.5 instead of 1 to accommodate 
zero values), the square root, the number in levels, and a binary variable indicating 
the presence of fatalities (the extensive margin). Defection messaging continues to 
reduce  LRA-related fatalities significantly regardless of the functional form used to 
measure the dependent variable. Online Appendix Section B.15 establishes robust-
ness of the results to  nonlinear estimators, such as fixed effects negative binomial, 
fixed effects Poisson and fixed effects logistic regressions.23
Table 3 focuses on the effects of defection messaging on the composition and 
strategic behavior of the LRA. We examine five different outcomes from the LRACT 
21 Online Appendix Section B.20 discusses potential sources of measurement error in the dependent variable 
and undertakes additional robustness checks to alleviate those concerns.
22 When included together in the same specification, neither the lagged nor the contemporaneous variable stands 
out as being more robust than the other. Hence, we continue using the contemporaneous variable as the preferred 
variable.
23 Results are robust to normalizing the dependent variable by population and area (online Appendix Section 
B.5), alternative cell resolutions (online Appendix B.3), using administrative units instead of grid cells (online 
Appendix B.13). Online Appendix Figure B19 displays the marginal effects of individual radio stations and estab-
lishes robustness to excluding one station at a time.
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database: the number of returnees (column 1) and abductees (column 2), and the 
number of events characterized by violence against civilians (column 3), clashes 
with security forces (column 4), and looting (column 5). The rows follow the same 
sequence of Table 2. Panel A uses a logarithmic transformation of the dependent 
Table 3—Effect of Defection Messaging on Additional Outcomes Related to LRA Violence







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Dependent variable in logs—log(y + 1)
 1. Benchmark 0.009 −0.005 −0.010 −0.006 0.016
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
A1. Alternative set of controls
 2. Basic controls 0.010 −0.006 −0.010 −0.006 0.017
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
 3. Basic and additional controls 0.010 −0.006 −0.010 −0.006 0.016
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
 4. Benchmark +  variable-specific trends 0.009 −0.005 −0.009 −0.006 0.016
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
 5. Benchmark + control for circular coverage 0.009 −0.005 −0.010 −0.006 0.016
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
A2. Alternative measure for messaging
 6. Average intensity of messaging 0.007 −0.003 −0.001 0.001 0.008
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
 7. Percent cell covered by defection messaging 0.050 −0.020 −0.025 −0.013 0.066
(0.018) (0.022) (0.015) (0.010) (0.016)
Panel B. Alternative dependent variable
 8. log(y + 0.5) 0.013 −0.005 −0.013 −0.009 0.023
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
 9. Square root of y 0.012 −0.016 −0.012 −0.008 0.021
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
 10. Levels 0.026 −0.212 −0.031 −0.012 0.044
(0.015) (0.077) (0.014) (0.006) (0.009)
 11. Extensive margin 0.006 0.002 −0.005 −0.006 0.012
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 60,600 60,600 60,600 60,600 60,600
Number of cells 7,575 7,575 7,575 7,575 7,575
Notes: The table reports marginal effects that are estimated using a fixed effects model. Standard errors in parenthe-
ses are allowed to be correlated over time and space (Conley 1999, 2008; Hsiang 2010). Unless otherwise specified, 
the independent variable is always intensity of defection messaging, defined by equation (1), and is standardized. 
The column headings indicate the dependent variables (based on data from the LRACT database). In panel A we 
use a logarithmic transformation of the dependent variable (adding 1 unit before taking logarithms to accommodate 
zero values). Row 1 controls for cell and year fixed effects, propagation controls (including controls for distance 
from active antennas in different forms, commodity price shocks, weather shocks, and  macro-region-specific time 
fixed effects (see Section III). Row 2 controls only for cell and year fixed effects. Row 3 adds propagation controls 
to the controls from row 2. Row 4 reverts to the benchmark specification of row 1, but also includes controls for 
 cell-level  variable-specific trends for terrain ruggedness,  ex ante income (proxied by nightlight),  ex ante population, 
urban area indicators, and country indicators. Row 5 controls for predicted  free-space circular coverage. Rows 6 and 
7 use alternative independent variables: average intensity calculated by dividing messaging intensity by the number 
of radio stations messaging in a particular cell (row 6); percentage of cell covered by defection messaging with-
out considering frequency of messaging (row 7). Panel B replicates the benchmark specification from row 1 using 
alternative functional forms for the dependent variable, as indicated by the row names. Extensive margin refers to a 
binary  0–1 dependent variable indicating  non-zero values of the outcome variable. The time period is restricted to 
2008–2015. See online Appendix A for further information on the variables.
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variable (adding 1 to accommodate 0 values). Row 1 presents the benchmark esti-
mates using equation (2). Row 2 restricts the control set to only cell and year fixed 
effects. Row 3 includes the propagation controls in addition to cell and year fixed 
effects. Row 4 reverts to the benchmark specification, but also includes controls for 
 variable-specific trends. Row 5 controls for circular coverage of the radio stations. 
Rows 6 and 7 use alternative measures of exposure to defection messaging. Panel B 
uses alternative functional forms of the dependent variables. Like in the case of the 
number of fatalities, online Appendix Table B18 provides estimates using  nonlinear 
estimators, for these outcomes.
A higher intensity of defection messaging leads to a significant increase in the 
total number of returnees (column 1 of Table  3). According to the benchmark 
 specification, a 1 standard deviation increase in the intensity of defection messaging 
increases the number of returnees by approximately 1 percent. Defection messag-
ing is thus effective in achieving its direct objective of encouraging LRA members 
to return to civil society. In online Appendix Section B.7, we undertake additional 
analysis to understand whether  interdependencies between fighters in their decision 
to return drives the increase in the number of returnees. We do not find evidence of 
such  interdependencies as defection messaging primarily increases events charac-
terized by one or two individuals defecting at a time rather than defections involving 
groups of three or more individuals (online Appendix Table B6).
In contrast to the absence of  interdependencies in fighters’ decisions to return, the 
survey of  ex-combatants conducted in DRC provides evidence of  interdependencies 
linked to information transmission (online Appendix D). While 66 percent of the 
survey respondents had heard defection messages directly themselves, more than 
94 percent had been exposed to defection messages through other group members. 
Since we cannot observe the location and quantity of fighters, and because the LRA 
units tend to move with some frequency, we cannot empirically test the role of infor-
mation spillover among LRA members. While the radio messages reach the individ-
ual fighters either directly because they themselves listen to the radio or indirectly 
from fellow combatants who share the information they have heard on the radio, the 
final decision to defect is primarily an individual decision.24
Column 2 of Table 3 examines how defection messaging affects the number of 
abductions by the LRA. Abduction has been a central recruitment strategy through-
out the LRA’s history. Estimates suggest that the LRA abducted around 60,000 to 
80,000 youths for at least a day between 1995 and 2004. The majority of the vic-
tims were adolescents, targeted due to the ease of indoctrinating children (Annan, 
Blattman, and Horton 2006; Beber and Blattman 2013). The LRA could have 
responded to the defection  messaging-induced loss in manpower by increasing the 
number of abductions. We do not find evidence for this. If anything, defection mes-
saging reduces the number of abductions by the LRA. However, this effect is not 
statistically significant except for the one specification using abductions in levels as 
the dependent variable.
24 Online Appendix Section B.7 provides a discussion on why despite receiving information from peers, rebels 
still prefer to defect individually rather than in groups. While the detection of any defection plan bears the highest 
penalties, consuming and sharing defection information, while also proscribed, bears lower penalties. The sharing 
of information could even conceivably be part of establishing the LRA’s  counter-narrative. We also investigate spa-
tial spillover of defection messaging, but do not find strong evidence in favor of it (online Appendix Section B.12).
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Columns 3 and 4 examine the effects of defection messaging on the number of 
events characterized by violence against civilians and clashes with security forces. A 
higher intensity of defection messages reduces both events. A 1 standard deviation 
increase in messaging intensity decreases the number of these events by approx-
imately 1 percent. This suggests that one possible mechanism in which defection 
messaging translates into a reduction in fatalities is through a decrease in the attacks 
carried out against civilians or clashes with security forces. As armed groups use 
violence against civilians strategically depending on their ability to control territory 
(Kalyvas 2006), the LRA could have reduced the number of attacks, but made each 
attack more violent. We do not find evidence in favor of this.
While defection messaging has a benign effect on all the other conflict variables, 
it significantly increases looting (column 5). A 1 standard deviation increase in the 
intensity of defection messaging increases looting events by 1.6 percent. In online 
Appendix Section B.9, we examine the types of goods being looted in response 
to more intense defection messaging. Looting increases for most goods including 
food, tools, clothes and medicines, weapons, and money. Nevertheless, compared to 
other commodities, looting of food increases by substantially more. This suggests 
that even though we cannot entirely rule out other possible mechanisms, the LRA 
resorts to looting as a survival strategy.
The marginal effects described above potentially hide  nonlinearities in the effects 
of defection messaging. To check how the effects of messaging on the different 
outcome variables vary with the intensity of the messaging, we estimate equation 
(2) by allowing the coefficient to vary  nonlinearly. More specifically, we use four 
dummy variables denoting intervals of different intensities of radio messaging: 0 
minutes, 0–30 minutes, 30–60 minutes, and more than 60 minutes of daily messag-
ing. Figure 6 plots the coefficients for the different outcomes against these intensity 
intervals. The  0-minute interval serves as the excluded category. While low levels 
of intensity have negligible impacts on the different variables, higher levels of mes-
saging intensity lead to significant and large effects. For instance, more than 60 
minutes of daily defection messaging (at full cell coverage) leads to a reduction in 
fatalities by 14.7 percent, an increase in the number of returnees by 6 percent, and 
an increase in looting by 9.7 percent.25 Figure 6 also demonstrates the  nonlinear 
effects of defection messaging on all the other variables, including violence against 
civilians, clashes with security forces and looting, but shows no significant effects 
on abductions. Formal tests confirm the  nonlinear effects of intensity of messaging 
(online Appendix Section B.22).
B. Aggregate Effects
We have established that defection messaging reduces  LRA-related conflict out-
comes, but we are also interested in estimating its aggregate impact on the LRA 
conflict. In online Appendix Section B.23, we construct counterfactual aggregate 
25 We always interpret marginal effects at full cell coverage. For instance, following equation (1), the 14.7 per-
cent effect on fatalities denotes the effect of 60+ minutes of messaging, when all cells are fully covered by radio 
signal. Since cells are not always (fully) covered by radio signal, an alternative way of interpreting the marginal 
effect would be as the effect of 120+ (doubling 60+) minutes of messaging when radio signals cover half the area 
in each cell.
1417ARMAND ET AL.: THE REACH OF RADIOVOL. 110 NO. 5
estimates of  LRA-related conflict outcomes in the absence of defection messaging. 
Since we observe the conflict outcomes only in the presence of defection messag-
ing, this lets us gauge what the outcomes would have looked like in the absence of 
defection messaging. Online Appendix Table B26 provides counterfactual estimates 
using alternative functional forms for the dependent variables and under alternative 
defection messaging scenarios. Estimates using  log-transformed dependent vari-
ables (adding 1 to accommodate 0 values) suggest that defection messaging resulted 
in 26.8 percent fewer fatalities (corresponding to 1,151 fewer deaths), 16.8 percent 
more returnees (297 individuals), 10.0 percent fewer violent events against civil-
ians and 9.4 percent fewer clashes with security forces. Estimates using dependent 
variables in levels are higher, suggesting that defection messaging resulted in 42.0 
percent fewer fatalities (2,270 fewer deaths), 33.7 percent more returnees (523 indi-
viduals), 12.7 percent fewer violent events against civilians, and 9.4 percent fewer 
clashes with security forces.26
26 These estimates are based on LRACT data and adding a quadratic term of the intensity of messaging to the 
benchmark specification of equation (2). As the objective is to predict the dependent variables, we allow for a more 
flexible functional form based on results in online Appendix Section B.22. Online Appendix Section B.23 provides 
estimates using alternative specifications and discusses differences between the estimates presented in Tables 2 and 
3, and aggregate effects.
Figure 6.  Nonlinear Effects of Defection Messaging
Notes: The figure plots the coefficients of equation (2) against the intensity of defection messaging. The intensity 
of defection messaging is decomposed into four dummy variables denoting different intervals of radio messaging 
intensity: 0 minutes, 0–30 minutes, 30–60 minutes, and more than 60 minutes of daily messaging. The dummy for 
“0 minutes” serves as the excluded category. The dependent variables are the number of fatalities (upper-left panel), 
the number of returnees (upper-middle panel), the number of abductees (upper-right panel), the number of events 
characterized by violence against civilians (bottom-left panel), clashes with security forces (bottom-middle panel), 
and looting (bottom-right panel). The dependent variables are measured in logarithms (adding one unit before tak-
ing logarithms to accommodate 0 values). For comparison, we allow the vertical axis to vary at the same scale for 
all outcome variables. Confidence intervals are computed at 95 percent of confidence, standard errors are allowed to 
be correlated over time and space (Conley 1999, 2008; Hsiang 2010). All specifications include cell and year fixed 
effects, propagation controls, additional controls, and interaction terms between year and  macro-region indicators. 
Additional controls include commodity price and weather shocks (see Section III). The time period is restricted to 
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C. Heterogeneity
Defection Messaging and Economic Shocks.—Economic incentives matter in 
combatants’ decision to join and continue in armed groups (Blattman and Miguel 
2010). By affecting the relative  trade-off between fighting or leaving the group, 
changes in economic incentives due to income shocks could also influence the effec-
tiveness of messaging. We examine how income shocks influence the LRA conflict 
and thereby the effectiveness of defection messaging. Following a stream of papers, 
we measure income shocks by shocks to the prices of commodities and natural 
resources (Bazzi and Blattman 2014, Berman et al. 2017, Dube and Vargas 2013). 
Given the lack of consensus in the literature regarding which commodities ought to 
be considered, and being cognizant of the  context-specificness of the LRA conflict, 
we rely on Lasso regressions to determine the relevant commodity shocks. Lasso 
regressions select cotton and groundnut as the two relevant commodities in this 
context from a longer list of commodities and natural resources.27
27 Shocks are defined combining temporal variation in prices (common to the whole area) with geographical 
variation in the area farmed with each commodity. This implies that we cannot identify the effects of shocks in 
areas where the commodities are not produced. We undertake a placebo test in online Appendix Section B.10 which 
shows that price shocks combined with randomly generated spatial distributions of commodities lead to insignifi-
cant effects on conflict.
Table 4—Defection Messaging and Commodity Price Shocks









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intensity of messaging −0.028 0.010 −0.005 −0.010 −0.006 0.016
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
 × cotton price shock −0.074 0.012 −0.016 −0.018 −0.016 0.052
(0.022) (0.017) (0.019) (0.014) (0.010) (0.016)
 × groundnut price shock 0.139 −0.102 0.029 0.047 0.036 −0.088
(0.035) (0.039) (0.037) (0.024) (0.016) (0.026)
Cotton price shock −0.022 0.012 0.004 −0.007 −0.005 0.013
(0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
Groundnut price shock 0.045 −0.037 0.010 0.013 0.001 −0.012
(0.019) (0.015) (0.019) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009)
Observations 60,600 60,600 60,600 60,600 60,600 60,600
Number of cells 7,575 7,575 7,575 7,575 7,575 7,575
Notes: The table reports marginal effects that are estimated using a fixed effects model. Standard errors in paren-
theses are allowed to be correlated over time and space (Conley 1999, 2008; Hsiang 2010). Intensity of messaging 
is defined by equation (1) and standardized. The column headings indicate the dependent variables (based on data 
from the LRACT database). The dependent variables are measured in logarithms (adding one unit before taking 
logarithms to accommodate 0 values). The shock variables are measured as a product of the percentage of the cell 
farmed with the crop and its  log-price difference with the previous year on the international market (and are not 
standardized). All specifications include cell and year fixed effects, propagation controls, additional controls, and 
year  ×  macro-region fixed effects. Additional controls include commodity price and weather shocks (see Section III). 
The time period is restricted to 2008–2015. See online Appendix A for further information on the variables.
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Table 4 presents estimates of equation (2) by allowing for heterogeneity in the 
effects of defection messaging by the two commodity price shocks.28 Intensity of 
messaging continues to have a statistically significant effect in the absence of com-
modity price shocks, as the main effect on the different conflict outcomes is unaf-
fected by the inclusion of interaction terms. While economic shocks matter, the 
main findings are not driven by areas experiencing economic shocks, or by mes-
saging being targeted to areas experiencing economic shocks. In online Appendix 
Section B.10, we also estimate the effect of defection messaging by restricting the 
sample to areas not covered by the production of cotton, groundnut, or either of the 
two  commodities. Estimates restricting the sample to any of these three  subsamples 
are similar to those using the whole study area.
When defection messaging is at its average (i.e., when standardized intensity of 
messaging is equal to 0), shocks to the price of cotton and groundnut have significant 
effects on the conflict, with these effects going in opposite directions. While positive 
shocks to the price of cotton reduce conflict, positive shocks to the price of ground-
nut enhance conflict. More specifically, cotton price shocks reduce fatalities, abduc-
tions (although this is not statistically significant), violence against civilians, and 
clashes with security forces, while increasing the number of returnees. For instance, 
a 10 percent increase in the price of cotton reduces fatalities by 0.22 percent, when 
cotton fully covers a cell. In contrast, shocks to the price of groundnut have exactly 
the opposite effect. A 10 percent increase in the price of groundnut leads to an 
increase in fatalities by 0.45 percent, when groundnut fully covers a cell.29
Turning to the interaction between commodity price shocks and the intensity of 
messaging, estimates show that the effectiveness of defection messaging is itself 
a function of the shocks. A positive shock to the price of cotton, which is conflict 
reducing, increases the effectiveness of defection messaging, while a positive shock 
to the price of groundnut, which is conflict enhancing, reduces the effectiveness 
of defection messaging. For fatalities, a 10 percent increase in the price of cotton 
increases the strength of defection messaging by generating an additional reduc-
tion of 0.74 percent in fatalities. A 1 standard deviation increase in the intensity of 
messaging in combination with a 10 percent increase in the price of cotton reduces 
fatalities by 3.54 percent. In contrast, a 10 percent increase in the price of ground-
nut reduces the strength of defection messaging by 1.39 percent in fatalities. In this 
case, a 1 standard deviation increase in the intensity of messaging in combination 
with a 10 percent increase in the price of groundnut reduces fatalities by 1.41 per-
cent. Figure 7 depicts the marginal effects of intensity of messaging for shocks of 
alternative sizes.30
28 Interaction terms are introduced linearly. One drawback of this assumption is that, for very large shocks, the 
overall effect of intensity of messaging can switch signs or become unrealistically large. Online Appendix Section 
B.11 presents estimates of marginal effects assuming instead a quadratic relationship.
29 We interpret the effects conditionally on cells being fully farmed with the crop. The shocks are measured as 
a product between the percentage of the cell historically farmed with the crop and its  log-price difference with the 
previous year on the international market. See Section IID for more details. Therefore a 10 percent increase in the 
price of the commodity corresponds to a 0.1 increase in the price shock variable when the cell is fully farmed with 
the commodity. Alternatively, when only 1/x  percent of the cell is farmed with the commodity it refers to an x  × 10 
percent increase in the price. Online Appendix Table B11 provides the  crop-specific summary statistics.
30 We can also report these effects as standardized. A 1 standard deviation increase in the value of the 
 conflict-reducing cotton price shock (0.172 or 17.2 percent at full cell coverage) increases the strength of defec-
tion messaging by 1.27 percentage points (−0.074  × 0.172), taking it to approximately 4 percent. In contrast, a 1 
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The effect of income shocks on conflict and on the effectiveness of defection mes-
saging can be explained by a burgeoning literature highlighting the role of economic 
shocks in civil conflicts. For instance, Dal Bó and Dal Bó (2011) models two poten-
tially opposing effects of income shocks on conflict using a  two-sector general equi-
librium framework. The two sectors in their framework are a  capital-intensive sector 
and a  labor-intensive sector. Positive shocks to the  labor-intensive sector reduce 
the intensity of conflict by increasing wages and reducing the supply of labor for 
conflict activities (see also Becker 1968, Grossman 1991, Hirshleifer 1995, Gates 
2002, Chassang and  Padró i Miquel 2009). This is the opportunity cost channel. The 
opposite is true for the  capital-intensive sector, where a positive shock increases the 
returns from predation (see also Fearon 2005; Grossman 1995; Bates, Greif, and 
Singh 2002). This is the rapacity channel.31 Building on this theoretical framework, 
standard deviation increase in the value of the  conflict-enhancing groundnut price shock (0.07 or 7 percent at full 
cell coverage) reduces the strength of defection messaging by 1 percentage point (−0.139  × 0.07), taking it to 
approximately 2 percent.
31 Rising revenues can also increase state capacity and the state’s ability to defend and strengthen control over 
territory (Fearon and Laitin 2003, Snyder 2006, Ross 2012).
Figure 7. Defection Messaging and Commodity Price Shocks
Notes: The figure plots marginal effects of intensity of messaging as function of commodity price shocks. Marginal 
effects are estimated using equation (2) interacting the intensity of messaging with cotton and groundnut price 
shocks, and assuming all other variables remain constant. The dependent variables are the number of fatalities, 
the number of returnees, the number of abductees, the number of events characterized by violence against civil-
ians, clashes with security forces, and looting. The dependent variables are measured in logarithms (adding one 
unit before taking logarithms to accommodate 0 values). Confidence intervals are computed at 95 percent of con-
fidence, standard errors are allowed to be correlated over time and space (Conley 1999, 2008; Hsiang 2010). All 
specifications include cell and year fixed effects, propagation controls, additional controls, and interaction terms 
between year and  macro-region indicators. Additional controls include commodity price and weather shocks (see 
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Dube and Vargas (2013) finds opposing effects of shocks to the prices of coffee 
( labor-intensive sector) and petroleum ( capital-intensive sector) in Colombia.32
The opposing effects of shocks to the prices of cotton and groundnut that we 
uncover here follow a similar pattern. Cotton is a  labor-intensive crop (Smalley 
2013). Positive shocks to cotton prices arguably increase labor market opportunities 
and the returns from working in the cotton sector, thereby reducing the labor supply 
for conflict activities. Anecdotal evidence supports this hypothesis. The cotton sec-
tor was a source for rebuilding livelihoods while the LRA conflict was abating (The 
Conservation Cotton Initiative; Anderson, Sewankambo, and Vandergrift 2004), 
and received international support in the form of cotton purchases to help rebuild 
livelihoods in the LRA affected areas. By underscoring the possibilities of immu-
nity, acceptability by society, and the logistics of returning, radio messages generate 
incentives that are complementary to the prospects of employment in the cotton sec-
tor. Hence, when cotton prices receive a positive shock, messaging becomes more 
effective in  reducing conflict. Groundnut, on the other hand, was being looted by 
the LRA due to its easy appropriability.33 Hence, positive shocks to the groundnut 
sector reflect higher incentives for looting, and reduce the effectiveness of radio 
messaging in bringing rebels out. Even if rebels can come out of the bush safely, the 
potential revenues from looting, in the absence of any counterbalancing economic 
incentives in the  nonconflict sector, reduce the allure of leaving the armed group.34
Heterogeneity by Messaging Content.—While the primary independent variable 
measures the intensity of defection messaging, many of the FM radio stations broad-
casting defection messages also broadcast alternative content that is not related to 
defections. One could argue that the intensity of defection messaging variable is pick-
ing up the effects of general coverage by the same radio stations rather than defection 
messaging. To rule out this possibility, we exploit information on the frequency of 
broadcasts of alternative content (including news broadcasts, religious preaching, 
and entertainment programs) by the radio stations broadcasting defection messages 
to build a measure of intensity of broadcast of alternative content. We define this 
variable using equation (1), but substituting the number of minutes of defection mes-
saging with the number of minutes of alternative broadcasts. Estimates of the effect 
of defection messaging are not affected by the inclusion of the intensity of alternative 
messages variable as a control (online Appendix Figure B18). Moreover, the broad-
cast of alternative content itself has no effect on the LRA conflict.
Furthermore, the defection messaging variable itself has grouped together dif-
ferent types of messaging content. This might hide potential heterogeneity in the 
32 Besley and Persson (2008) presents a related  two-sector framework exploiting volatility in import and export 
commodity prices. For the opportunity cost channel, see also Burke et al. (2009); Hsiang, Meng, and Cane (2011); 
and Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004). For the rapacity or predation channel, see also Berman et al. (2017), 
and Humphreys (2005).
33 For anecdotal evidence about the role of cotton and groundnut in the conflict, refer to, for instance, Hugo 
Slim, “War and Peace in North Uganda,” The Guardian, February 19, 2008 (https://www.theguardian.com/
katine/2008/feb/19/background); Chris McGreal, “Congo Villagers Tell of a Life Plagued by Killers on All Sides,” 
The Guardian, August 9, 2001 (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/aug/09/congo.chrismcgreal); and the 
LRA Crisis Tracker (https://crisistracker.org/incidents/363286).
34 While a lot of the literature has put forward similar theoretical arguments and empirical results about eco-
nomic shocks, we acknowledge that the discussion above is an  ex post rationalization. Available data do not allow 
testing of specific channels in the LRA setting.
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relative effectiveness of different types of messages. In online Appendix Section 
B.19 we estimate equation (2) by splitting the intensity of messaging variable into 
two broad categories based on whether they broadcast sensitization content or logis-
tical content. Sensitization content primarily refers to programs with interviews of 
 ex-combatants, family members of the combatants, and their community leaders. 
The interviewees talk about their experiences on returning, and/or make emotional 
appeals to their friends and kin to return home. Logistical content, on the other hand, 
comprises logistical information on surrendering such as locations of safe defection 
points. These two types of broadcasts can be associated to the two different channels 
through which persuasive communication works (as discussed in the introduction). 
While logistical content is likely to be closer to a channel affecting fighters’ beliefs, 
sensitization content is possibly closer to the preferences channel.
We do not find any significant difference in the effects of the intensities of the 
two types of content (online Appendix Figure B18). By design, defection messages 
often simultaneously broadcast both sensitization and logistical content ( UN-DDR 
2014). This is also observed in survey data, in which the correlation between the two 
types of intensities is high (0.96). This results in imprecise estimates of the effect of 
each component of defection messaging. This is also confirmed by content analysis 
of defection messages.35 It is therefore difficult to disentangle the relative effective-
ness of each type of content. However, a complementary analysis focusing on the 
specialization of radio stations leads to similar conclusions. We distinguish between 
intensity of messaging broadcast from DDR radio stations, managed by the UN/
armed forces and arguably specialized in logistical content, and  community-based 
radio stations, specialized in sensitization content. Messages broadcast from these 
two types of radio stations are equally effective (online Appendix Figure B18).
To understand further the role of content in defection messaging, we distinguish 
between defection content broadcast in Acholi (in addition to other languages), and 
defection content broadcast exclusively in languages other than Acholi. Messaging 
that is exclusively broadcast without using Acholi is more effective as compared to 
messaging that uses Acholi. This possibly indicates the success of messaging on the 
more recent recruits who are drawn from  non-Acholi populations. We also distin-
guish between radio stations according to their ethnic alignment to the Acholi by 
exploiting their general broadcast language. The general broadcast language might 
indicate a radio station’s ethnic affiliation or that of the population to which it usu-
ally caters. We do not find any significant difference between defection messaging 
that is broadcast by radios with either a low or high ethnic distance from the Acholi. 
This suggests that messaging is not necessarily less successful with the Acholi peo-
ple due to a lack of ethnic identification with the radio station. Rather, the language 
of broadcast might matter due to its comprehensibility by current recruits.
While we cannot observe the ethnic identities of individual returnees, we explore 
local variation in ethnic distance from the Acholi population by using detailed data 
on the spatial distribution of ethnic groups (available at the 5 km  × 5 km resolution 
from Desmet, Gomes, and Ortuño-Ortín 2020) and computing ethnic distance at 
the  cell level. The more ethnically distant a cell is from Acholi, the more effective 
35 Online Appendix Section E presents a text analysis exercise that we undertake on 86 digitized defection mes-
sages. Results show that broadcast messages contained both sensitization and logistical content.
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defection messaging is in the cell (online Appendix Table B19). During the 2008–
2015 period, the LRA relied on the abduction of local conscripts from the bordering 
regions of DRC, South Sudan, and CAR where they operated. The local populations 
in these areas are ethnically very different from the Acholi (online Appendix Figure 
B15). The higher effectiveness of messaging in these areas might suggest that it was 
easier to convince local recruits, who experience weaker ties to the Acholi, to return.
Further Heterogeneity.—Online Appendix Section B.18 investigates heterogene-
ity in the effect of messaging by a variety of variables, focusing on  cross-sectional 
variation in characteristics related to geopolitics, economic prosperity, geography, 
and climate. We provide evidence in favor of homogeneous effects by country, dis-
tance from a border, terrain ruggedness, temperature shocks, rainfall shocks, and 
share of the year with drought. We observe a larger effect for the latter phase of the 
conflict.
In the absence of more direct measures, we proxy economic prosperity by night-
light, population, infant mortality, and the total value of cash crops in each cell. We 
uncover evidence of a significantly stronger effect of messaging in cells with lower 
population, zero nightlight values, and a relatively lower value of cash crops. Areas 
with  nonzero nightlight values (around 10 percent of the study area) and areas with 
larger population identify the few larger urban centers, where the LRA does not 
operate (Lancaster, Lacaille, and Cakaj 2011). This is confirmed by a significantly 
larger effect of defection messaging in areas with higher forest cover. In urban cen-
ters and areas with lower forest cover, messaging has lower possibilities of affecting 
conflict outcomes due to the absence of fighters. In addition, theoretically the effects 
of prosperity can go in any direction depending on whether the opportunity cost or 
the rapacity channel dominates (see Section  IVC). For instance, less prosperous 
areas are also areas with fewer opportunities to extract resources by looting, and 
have harsher living conditions. Hence, it might be easier to convince rebels to give 
up arms in these areas.
D. Robustness Checks
We conduct a host of additional analyses and robustness tests to rule out poten-
tially confounding channels. We begin by focusing on alternative communication 
media that might be correlated with both violence and defection messaging. In Table 
5, we estimate equation (2) controlling for the coverage of two types of alternative 
media. First, in panel A, we control for GSM mobile phone coverage. Mobile phone 
coverage could potentially enhance coordination among individuals (Manacorda 
and Tesei 2016) and aid counterinsurgency through information sharing and intel-
ligence collection (Shapiro and Weidmann 2015). Estimates of defection messag-
ing intensity are unchanged by controlling for mobile phone coverage.36 Second, 
panel B shows that controlling for general FM radio coverage does not affect the 
36 Mobile phone coverage has a negative effect on some of the outcomes, such as clashes. When we interact 
mobile coverage with the intensity of defection messaging, we do not find any complementary effect to intensity of 
messaging in reducing fatalities. Due to the potential endogeneity of mobile phone coverage, we take this result as 
being suggestive. These results are available upon request.
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results. This rules out the possibility that intensity of defection messaging picks up 
the effects of coverage of alternative FM radio stations broadcasting general content 
in the area.37
Next, we examine the spillover of defection messaging targeted at the LRA 
on other ongoing conflicts. While positive spillovers could reduce other ongoing 
violent conflicts in the region, negative spillovers might increase activity by other 
armed groups as the LRA loses its strength. We turn to the ACLED and UCDP data-
sets that provide information on other armed groups operating in the area. We do 
not find evidence of any such spillover. While defection messaging exerts a strong 
negative effect on  LRA-related violent events,  LRA-targeted defection messaging 
has null effects on conflict events unrelated to the LRA (online Appendix Table B7). 
Furthermore, the ACLED and UCDP data allow us to determine whether the LRA 
is the perpetrator or on the receiving end of violence in  LRA-related conflict events. 
While defection messaging reduces both attacks perpetrated by the LRA and attacks 
against them, the coefficients on violence perpetrated by the LRA are much larger 
(online Appendix Table B7). This again suggests that defection messaging was par-
ticularly effective in reducing  LRA-specific conflict activities.
37 Information about general FM coverage is available at one point in time only (see Section IID). Therefore, we 
control for general FM radio coverage by interacting it with year trends. Estimates are robust to using interactions 
with year dummies instead. Results are not shown here and are available upon request.
Table 5—Defection Messaging and Alternative Coverage









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Controlling for GSM coverage
 Intensity of messaging −0.027 0.009 −0.005 −0.010 −0.006 0.016
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
 GSM coverage (percent cell) −0.018 −0.003 −0.006 −0.017 −0.020 0.001
(0.015) (0.011) (0.018) (0.012) (0.008) (0.017)
Panel B. Controlling for general FM radio coverage
 Intensity of messaging −0.028 0.009 −0.006 −0.010 −0.006 0.016
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
 Radio coverage −0.001 −0.001 −0.002 −0.001 −0.000 −0.002
  (percent cell, FMLIST) × year (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 60,600 60,600 60,600 60,600 60,600 60,600
Number of cells 7,575 7,575 7,575 7,575 7,575 7,575
Notes: The table reports marginal effects that are estimated using a fixed effects model. Standard errors in paren-
theses are allowed to be correlated over time and space (Conley 1999, 2008; Hsiang 2010). Intensity of messag-
ing is defined by equation (1) and standardized. The column headings indicate the dependent variables (based on 
data from the LRACT database). The dependent variables are measured in logarithms (adding one unit before tak-
ing logarithms to accommodate 0 values). While the GSM mobile network coverage is  time-varying, general FM 
radio coverage is observed at only one point of time and hence we control for it in the form of interactions with 
the year variable. All specifications include cell and year fixed effects, propagation controls, additional controls 
and  macro-region-specific time fixed effects. Additional controls include commodity price and weather shocks 
(see Section III). The time period is restricted to 2008–2015. See online Appendix A for further information on the 
variables.
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One could also argue that the expansion of defection messaging took place 
along with concomitant investments in improving the local economy of affected 
regions, which could also confound the results. Since identification exploits 
 topography-corrected intensity of messaging, it is unlikely that economic conditions 
also follow the same random patterns generated by topography. Nevertheless, if the 
results were driven by improvements in general economic conditions, we should 
observe a decrease in violence by all armed groups rather than just the LRA as the 
result of defection messaging. We do not (online Appendix Table B7).
Exploiting the ACLED and UCDP datasets further also allows us to rule out con-
founding effects of possible increases in military action by security forces. While 
it is implausible that military action replicates the pattern of  topography-corrected 
radio signals, we undertake additional analysis in online Appendix Section B.8 
to rule out this possibility. Rather than observing increased military activity, we 
observe a fall in events in which state forces are perpetrators of violence when the 
intensity of messaging is higher. Controlling for military presence in a specific cell 
does not affect estimates of the impact of defection messaging. The reduction in 
LRA violence as a result of increased intensity of defection messaging is there-
fore not associated with a contemporaneous increase in military activity (online 
Appendix Table B8).
Section IVA established the robustness of the effect of defection messaging to 
the inclusion of circular coverage as a control. We elaborate on this result further 
in online Appendix Table B24, which shows that apart from the results not being 
affected by controlling for it, circular coverage itself does not have any significant 
effect on the conflict outcomes. This result is also supported by the low correlation 
between circular coverage and intensity of messaging (0.38 in the whole study area, 
0.13 if restricted to be within 100 km from an antenna). While there is substantial 
variation in both the  cross-sectional and time components in defection messaging as 
well as all the conflict variables, by looking at circular coverage, we also show that 
both topographical and time variation contributes to the identification of the effect 
of intensity of messaging (online Appendix Section B.21).38
Finally, to examine the role of antenna location in the reduction of LRA vio-
lence, we perform a placebo test by constructing a measure of hypothetical exposure 
to defection messages through random spatial  reallocations of the radio antennas 
(online Appendix Section B.14). Within the original area of analysis, we randomly 
generate new locations for the antennas of the radio stations in the study and cal-
culate hypothetical intensity of messaging keeping the timing and frequency of 
messaging aligned with the actual data. Online Appendix Table B17 summarizes 
the results of 250 simulations estimating equation (2) using placebo exposure. The 
effect of defection messaging with random placebo antennas is, on average, zero 
on all conflict variables. The results suggest that the effect captured using the real 
38 We complement this analysis by estimating the effect of messaging restricting the sample to areas with cir-
cular coverage, exploiting topography variation within these areas (online Appendix Section B.21). Furthermore, 
we estimate the effects using different sets of area fixed effects ranging from no area fixed effects (i.e., pooled data 
exploiting pure  cross-sectional variation) to the gridded dataset using cell fixed effects at the 0.125 °  ×  0.125 ° reso-
lution. This includes a wide number of specifications with area fixed effects of different sizes. Results confirm that 
both topographical and time variation contribute to the effect of defection messaging.
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 intensity of defection messaging is not driven by the timing of the expansion of 
defection messaging, but rather by the combination of timing and antenna location.
V. Conclusion
The LRA insurgency has been a costly and bloody conflict that has devastated 
hundreds of thousands of lives in multiple countries across central Africa over sev-
eral decades. This is only the tip of the iceberg, the mass of which comprises the 
more than 40 active violent conflicts currently inflicting immense human and eco-
nomic costs on communities across the world.39 While feasible counterinsurgency 
policies are in short supply (Humphreys 2003), we provide evidence of a policy 
that works. Most armed groups operate in remote locations spanning large areas 
where conventional military operations are infeasible. We show that in such settings, 
FM radio messaging can effectively encourage defections among rebels and reduce 
overall violence.
We collected original data on radio broadcasts encouraging LRA combatants to 
give up arms and return to civilian life. By exploiting random  topography-driven 
variation in radio coverage, panel variation at the  grid-cell level, as well as the ran-
dom overlap of multiple radio signals, we established the causal effect of defection 
messaging on various conflict outcomes. We uncovered evidence that  broadcasting 
defection messages encourages defections from the LRA and reduces fatalities, vio-
lence against civilians, and clashes with security forces. Overall, defection  messaging 
saved more than 1,000 lives during the 2008–2015 period, which represents more 
than one-quarter of the fatalities inflicted by the LRA during the period.
Apart from establishing the effectiveness of defection messaging as a  low-cost 
and  nonviolent counterinsurgency policy, we uncover two additional policy lessons. 
First, we find that economic incentives as measured by commodity price shocks 
directly affect LRA activity and also the effectiveness of defection messaging. This 
suggests that beyond focusing on pathways to leave conflict, counterinsurgency pol-
icies should also take into account the economic incentives that motivate fighters. 
Second, more attention and consideration should be directed to the effects of defec-
tions on remaining members. While fatalities can be considered the main indicator 
of conflict intensity and violence, other actions of armed groups, such as looting, can 
also be costly for affected communities. We saw that a higher intensity of defection 
messaging increases looting in the same areas where it reduced fatalities and other 
forms of violence. Defection messaging operations should thus be complemented 
by interventions that disincentivize fighters from looting.
This paper also opens up several avenues for further research. While we have 
established the effectiveness of defection messaging in general, more work is 
required to disentangle the effects of emotional appeals by friends and kin from 
purely logistical information about how to leave the armed groups. Finally, more 
research is warranted on how defection messaging influences rebels beyond directly 
encouraging them to return.
39 “Mapped: A World at War,” IRIN News, April 4, 2017, https://www.irinnews.org/maps-and-graphics/ 
2017/04/04/updated-mapped-world-war.
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